









Memory and Metaphysics: a Joint Reading of Time and Being and What is metaphysics?

The utterance of the past is always an oracular pronouncement. You will understand it only as builders of the future and as people who know about the present. (Nietzsche 1997, 6)
Time and Being is a conference that Heidegger holds on January 31, 1962 at the University of Freiburg, and one of his rare conferences that he still holds after having put a final end to his teaching in 1959. From its very title, and the terms and concepts that it contains, it seems to indicate a coming to fruition of the much talked-about “turn” (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought. That the “turn” is not to be interpreted as a process of thinking, and that therefore it does not indicate a change in the process of thinking, but rather the very essence of the matter in question (Sachverhalt), Heidegger himself has been sufficiently clear as to such distinction. And yet, belonging as it is to the very essence of the matter in question, how is the turn to be understood: is it a return, a going back to, a repetition, in a sense a remembering? Or is it a detour, a departure, away from the source, this latter, as the source, being ever more forgotten but still at work, even in what is farthest away from it? The turn that belongs to the essence of the matter in question, Being and time, time and Being, is it a remembering or a forgetting, does it have the shape of a circle, or that of the going forward?
On one hand we have here the concept of time, and on the other that of our relation to time. From a Kantian perspective, we may never know what time in itself is, but we may formulate a judgment, based on our experience of time, on what our relation to time is. Or can we only have an understanding of our relation to time on the basis of our understanding of what is time in itself? Is not the case that our implicit understanding of the essence of time always informs our relation to time, and that whether we declare that the essence of time is something not worth questioning, or that we persist in our questioning of the essence of time, our relation to time will change accordingly? Be that as it may, our questioning of time remains determined in relation to that of being. Therefore, our understanding of being, whether we understand Being in terms of present beings, or that we question Being without regard for beings, will determine our understanding of time, and whether we are concerned with what is the essence of time, or merely with what is temporal. Being understood in terms of beings, and time understood in terms of the present as present-being do not only manifest themselves in the phenomena of calculation and production, they also do so at the level of the imaginary, as time travel for example, the magic being only the primitive form of science as the dominion of man over the world. But science, in the singular, understood as the scientific method, is today only the culmination of metaphysics, from whom science departs. Metaphysics, on its part, represents the most sustained historical effort of questioning beings and time in terms of one another. Time understood in relation to Being and vice versa, name also the matter in question, this latter being the relation itself, or as Heidegger names it, the holding of the question, (der Sachverhalt), that which holds Being and time together, not Being, nor time, but Being and time. The matter in question is thus twofold, hence the duplicity in the meaning of the turn. The matter in question is the relation of metaphysics to Being and time and, the questioning of this metaphysical relation. Thus, for Heidegger, metaphysics itself is a more essential problem than those that it tries to resolve. Is the “destruction” – Destruktion – of metaphysics an overcoming of metaphysics, and as such a looking ahead into what comes next, or is it rather, as Heidegger puts it so many times, the “step back from out of metaphysics” (der Schritt zurück aus der Metaphysik), and therefore a more essential remembering of what is the essence of metaphysics? In both cases, a crucial dimension of the question remains: what is memory? What is memory in the relation of metaphysics to Being and time? And, what is memory in the “step back from out of metaphysics”?
The matter in question (der Sachverhalt) as the turn of one matter (Sache) of thinking – Being – into another – time, and vice versa; the matter in question as that relation which is not produced by putting together Being and time, but which, instead, as Being and time, first produces (ergibt) Being and time. It is in this relation as a holding-together that Being and time are first given: more primordial than Being or time is here the conjunction “and”, which as difference, holds together by folding together Being and time. Heidegger insists on the “and”, the “hold” and “fold” as the difference which gives Being and time: “Being and time, time and Being name here the relation of both matters, the matter in question that holds both matters to one another and thus it tends out their relation. It is given to thinking to reflect after such relation” (Heidegger 1968, 20).​[1]​ This matter in question which, as the “and” of difference, the conjunction, joins together both matters, is named further along the conference “Ereignis”, a term which Heidegger warns us not to understand as “event” or “happening”, but rather as propriation, i.e. that which brings about, or gives something in its very proper, or its very own. Moreover, Heidegger warns us not to see in the “Ereignis” another figure in the series of the metaphysical interpretations of Being. The “Ereignis” is not to be subordinated to Being, but has instead a priority over Being. All of which does not mean that, in a mere reversal, it is now Being that is to be subordinated to “Ereignis”. The matter in question does not consist here in logical relationships of order, but as “Ereignis” is to be understood as the destiny (Geschick) of presence (Anwesenheit) that lies in the tension (Reichen) of Time:
Then, Being would be a kind of Ereignis and not Ereignis a kind of Being. But it would be very cheap to flee in such reversal. This reversal thinks aside of the matter in question. The Ereignis is not here the all-grabbing super-concept after which Being and time let themselves fall in line. Logical relationships of order don’t mean here anything. (Heidegger 1968, 60)​[2]​
Let us clarify for a moment the different meanings intertwined in the term that I translate as the “tension of Time”, and that in French is often translated with the Latin “porrigere”. The term “Reichen” means here both holding, like offering or giving, when, in a hand gesture, we hold something to someone, and also reaching, reaching towards someone but also reaching to grab that which is being held. In this sense, the terms bears an affinity to intentionality, while at the same time differing from it, in that this latter indicates a directionality that goes from the consciousness to the object of perception. It is only from this “holding” – which is as well a withholding or withdrawing –  that the relation of Being and time can then later become the theme of an intentional positing, as when Heidegger writes in the above quote that: “the matter in question holds both matters to one another and thus tends out their relation”. In this sense of holding-reaching, the term refers to the original co-implication of the temporal dimensions – past, present and future – in which they tend to one another as they are folded into each-other. This tending to one another is also a concern, and that is why the preliminary meaning of temporality is worked out by Heidegger, since Being and time, as care (Sorge) or concern. The term has also a connotation of reigning, and as such it refers to that all-encompassing pre-spatial dimension that Heidegger calls time-space (Zeit-Raum). Again, here the time-space is not to be confused with the mathematical-physical time-space, but is instead, as the pre-spatial, that which allows for any scientific representation of the time-space. This pre-spatial time-space is the very tension of time, the co-implication of all the temporal dimensions as the essential play (Zuspiel) of time. It is what Heidegger calls the fourth dimension of time, or the presence (Anwesenheit), which is to be distinguished from the objected presence (Gegenwart). This presence in the sense of Anwesenheit – i.e. in an active sense, the prefix “an’ in German connoting a movement of approach: the presence that comes to dwelling – is that which all the temporal dimensions tend to one another in their co-implication as the play of time. And therefore, finally, this “tension of time” is, properly speaking, a tension, i.e., not only what holds the three temporal dimensions together, but also what keeps them apart.
Let us now focus our attention on what Heidegger says here with regard to metaphysics: if Being is to be understood as Ereignis, this is not to be taken either as a progress of metaphysics nor as a reversal of it. We are certainly reminded here of the famous line from the Letter on humanism, namely that “The reversal of a metaphysical proposition still remains a metaphysical proposition” (Heidegger 1947, 17). The term used in German in both cases for “reversal” is “Umkehrung”. So if the turn (Kehre) indicates the very essence of the matter in question (Sachverhalt), and this matter in question is in turn named “Ereignis”, then this “Ereignis” is not a reversal, nor even a revolution, of metaphysics. Hence, Heidegger’s insistence that “Ereignis” be not interpreted in its usual meaning as event or happening. Towards the end of the conference, with regard to metaphysics, Heidegger writes:
To think Being without beings means: to think Being without regard for metaphysics. Such regard is dominant even when one aims to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, it is better to let go of overcoming and to let metaphysics to itself. If an overcoming still remains necessary, then it concerns that thinking that properly lets himself into the Ereignis (Heidegger 1968, 66)​[3]​
Is this, “without regard for metaphysics” a “without respect for metaphysics” and as such a forgetting of metaphysics? Is Heidegger inviting us here to forget about metaphysics, to leave it to its fate as an outdated instrument that has done its time, and whose time is now past? Should we now leave metaphysics as we change instruments in our progressive pursuit of goals? What comes out clearly from the above quote is that the overcoming is not to be dropped out altogether in our proceeds with metaphysics, but that it takes on a rather auxiliary role to that which should be primary, namely: letting oneself properly into the “Ereignis”. If the overcoming is necessary, it is only so in order to ground this letting into the “Ereignis”; but as auxiliary, the overcoming is thus not only the mere auxiliary of such introduction, it is also its ancillary. As such, I cannot help but notice that the relation of the overcoming of metaphysics to this introduction into the “Ereignis” mirrors the very nature of metaphysics, as Heidegger has repeatedly expound it, i.e. the revolving into one-another of ontology and theology, as the technical relationship of ontology and theology. We must think here the “turn” (Kehre), and the representation of memory as logos, i.e., as knowledge, in a primordial sense, as technique. 
But what is the meaning of this “proper introduction” into the matter in question as “Ereignis”? Let us recall the programmatic lines in which Heidegger seemed at first to lay out the task of an overcoming of metaphysics, in Being and Time, an overcoming which he then called “the destruction of the history of ontology”:
We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being … But this destruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; … But to bury the past in nullity is not the purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive; its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect. (Heidegger 1962, 22)​[4]​
Re-reading these lines, we realize that the “destruction” of metaphysics is, in a crucial dimension, a relationship to the past. Indeed, what Heidegger calls the “positive side” of this “destruction” is concerned with the past, and this in a twofold way. Only its “negative side”, “is aimed at ‘today’”. The destruction is concerned with the past in a positive way first, in that it is an attempt at re-finding our “primordial experiences”, our “first ways”. Thus, the “destruction” would be, using a Proustian metaphor, a remembrance, an enterprise “à la recherche du temps perdu”. And second, the “destruction” is concerned with the past in realizing the greatness of the tradition, and that is what the attempt at “keeping it within its limits” means: it is only when we see the limits that we have seen the greatness of a thinking.
Thus, the “destruction” of metaphysics begins with a re-questioning of the problem of time. This problem is forgotten by metaphysics with its interpretation of Being on the basis of beings. As the difference between Being and beings is forgotten, and along with this difference, the priority of the question of Being, so is the difference between time and the temporal. Time understood from the now-, or present-being is the attribute of that which passes in time, the accidental, or thus the temporal in contradistinction with the essential or the non-temporal. In this perspective, the eternal is again a now, but which does not pass in time. For Heidegger, on the contrary, temporality is the essential component of the existing, in that time is not here understood from a timeless now and being. The term existence is to be understood precisely in the sense of temporality as care or concern and away from the concepts of subjectivity or substance. But existence thus understood in its temporal essence as care is as much a reaching out as a staying within; indeed it escapes the distinction between transcendence and immanence. In What is metaphysics?, Heidegger gives us a nice summary of what he understands by existence as temporality: 
What does ‘Existenz’ mean in Being and Time? The word names a way of Being, … of that being that stands open for the openness of Being in that, in standing in this openness, it outstands it. This outstanding is experienced as ‘care’. The ecstatic essence of Dasein is thought on the basis of care …The ecstatic essence of the Existenz will be insufficiently understood if it is represented only as “standing out”, and then the “out” in turn is conceived as “away from” the inner of the immanence of consciousness or of the spirit. So understood, the Existenz would still be represented on the basis of the ‘subjectivity’ or the ‘substance’, whereas the “out”, instead, is to be understood as out-from-one-another of the openness of Being. As unusual as this may sound, the stasis of the ecstatic consists in staying in, in the ‘out’ and in the ‘there’ of the unveiling, as which Being itself is present. That which is to be thought in the term ‘Existenz’, … can be best rendered by the term “instanding-ness’. (Heidegger 1960, 15)​[5]​
As we can see from this summary, the Proustian metaphor of remembrance is not appropriate. For, if the “destruction” is indeed a remembrance, it is nothing like the Proustian or the Bergsonian remembrance. It is not an introspection for reminiscence, voluntary or involuntary; it is not an attempt at finding an idyllic past, some state of nature, or of beginning, the innocence of childhood. This attempt at “arriving at our primordial experiences” and “our first ways” is not a “Renaissance” of pre-Socratic philosophy as a way of reaching to a “world of life” as opposed to the “world of knowledge” – in Heidegger’s most repeated and express terms, such attempt would be “futile and a countersense”. But if this “destruction” is indeed, in an essential way, a relationship to the past, and it can be characterized as a genealogical attempt – in a Nietzschean sense, i.e, not as an explanation of what came out of what, but as a transforming interpretation – then this “destruction” is indeed an attempt at questioning the origin. Not an origin of the beginnings, but an origin that remains as active in the present as it were at the beginning and even more fundamentally so that it remains hidden. The “primordial experiences” that are thus aimed, are not those of a so-called “world of life”, but the ek-sistence as a fundamental dimension of all experience. This origin of experience that concerns us while being equally hidden from us, as much in the Greek world as in our own, Heidegger names it destiny, or presence in the sense of Anwesenheit. But, as ek-sistence is not to be confused with selfhood, consciousness or intentionality, it is not to be confused either with presence as Anwesenheit. On the one hand, the ek-static dimension of ek-sistence first provides the space within which there can be any intentionality or consciousness: “To where and from where and in what free dimension should all intentionality of consciousness move if man didn’t have its essence in the Instanding-ness?” (Heidegger 1960, 16).​[6]​ On the other hand, the question of existenz is only at the service of that other question that still remains to be unfolded, the question after the truth of Being as the hidden ground of metaphysics (Heidegger 1960, 17). The destiny of this understanding of Being as Anwesenheit extends today its dominion over us in all the manifestations of technology.
That is why, in order to think the essence of the over-reaching dominion of technology, Heidegger poses again the need, in Time and Being to think Being without beings: “The attempt to think Being without beings becomes necessary for otherwise, as it appears to me, there is no other possibility to bring to view the Being of that which today is around the globe” (Heidegger 1968, 14).​[7]​ That which turns today around the globe as the destiny to which we are bound, and to which holds in our memory all discourse on beings, is the determination of Being as Anwesenheit, a determination which today rules through the unchecked technological expansion:
Since the modern technique has established its expansion and dominion over the entire earth, it is not only satellites and their derivatives that turn around our planet, but Being as presence (Anwesen) in the sense of the calculable availability speaks to all the inhabitants of the earth, without that the inhabitants of the outer-European part of the earth could know anything about this, or even less about the origin of this determination of Being. It is the busy developers who would like the least to make such knowing public, those developers who today press the so-called under-developed into the domain of appropriation (Hörbereich) of that claim of Being that speaks from out of the essence of the modern technique. (Heidegger 1960, 28)​[8]​
These lines make it clear for once that if Heidegger insists so strongly on what he calls the “determination of Being as Anwesenheit”, the term and the concept do not connote any moral superiority over other possible determinations of Being. It would be just as naïve to see in the concept of Anwesenheit any connotation of moral priority as to interpret Heidegger’s thinking as against metaphysics or technique. Ethical balancing is not what is here in question, although the question, as we could see from the above quote, does certainly bring with it an unavoidable moral responsibility. On the other hand, the above quote directly introduces us into the question of “poetics and politics of memory”. In this perspective, I wonder, without however making any generalization, whether the attempt, which today tends to become ever more prevalent in the field of education, to release the Western-centrism of education, is not contributing to the ever more pressing dominion of the West? And this precisely by forgetting what is essentially Western in our present world-destiny. On the other hand, as even Heidegger says that thinking and poetry are essentially the same and at the same time essentially far apart from each-other, there could be poetics of memory that, under the call for a remembrance of time, place, or innocence lost, leave under forgetfulness that which should be the most essential matter for thinking and poetry to remember. Nietzsche here comes to mind when he reminds us that the source of resentment is the mirage of the past when it is merely past.
Thus, before being a remembering of Being itself, the overcoming of metaphysics –  which is in this way essentially memory and as such the step beyond is only the auxiliary of the step back – is first an awaking of our attention to the forgetting of Being: 
Provided that the overcoming of metaphysics corresponds to the effort of learning how to pay attention first to the forgetting of Being, in order to experience this forgetting and to take it over and preserve it in the relationship of Being to man, then in this time of need that is this forgetting of Being, the question ‘What is metaphysics?’ remains perhaps the most needed for thinking. (Heidegger 1960, 13)​[9]​
The question “What is metaphysics?” is then needed first of all not in order to remember but first to fully experience the forgetting of Being. But if metaphysics is the forgetting of Being, is metaphysics then a mere forgetfulness? Let us raise the question again: What is metaphysics? Simply put, following in this closely Heidegger’s thinking: metaphysics is our destiny. It is our destiny for that destiny which metaphysics, unbeknownst of itself, holds in itself. The destiny is that which, as Heidegger puts it, without our doing or contribution, falls to our share (Heidegger 1960, 28). Metaphysics as our destiny refers here to the tradition, and this tradition is that of the different figures in the series of interpretations of the destiny of Being. In its turn, the destiny of Being, destiny as share or participation, is precisely the sharing in or the participation into each other of the verbal and the nominal in the word “being”. As holder of this duplicity, metaphysics is then synonymous to the entire philosophy whose most essential structure is that of onto-theology. Following this essential duplicity of being, then being is at the same time the most common attribute of everything, and that which is exclusively unique, the highest. The inquiry after beings that is undertaken by metaphysics follows a two-step process: first, to find a bear minimally common essence of things and to ground it on a higher principle. Or otherwise stated: after describing the phenomena, to go back to their cause. To the question of what is metaphysics, in the conference that holds this title, Heidegger formally responds: “Metaphysics is the questioning beyond beings in order to regain them back as such and as a whole for the concept” (Heidegger 1960, 38)​[10]​. Following this quote then, I would say that in its ontological questioning metaphysics is the memory of theology, which is in this way the auxiliary of ontology. The ontology then is done at the service of theology and is therefore, in the sense of support, its auxiliary, too. But Heidegger warns us not to see in this technical turn of ontology into theology, and vice versa, a relationship of subordination, nor of equal coordination. For Heidegger, this mutual, technical turn of ontology into theology is the same, i.e. the same precedence of beings over Being for a thinking that glances at Being only in passing, in its passage from beings to a higher being.
This mutual turning into one-another of ontology and theology that characterizes the structure of metaphysics is also one dimension of the turn that belongs to the matter in question – the destiny of Being. As such turn – memory itself in its aspect of return or going back is also a turn – metaphysics is essentially memory. From Plato’s idea to Aristotle’s energeia to Kant’s positio to Hegel’s absolute concept to Nietzsche’s will to power, the metaphysical tradition is the repetition, i.e., the remembering, in different names of this same duplicity in the destiny of Being. But if destiny is participation, the participation presupposes difference. Metaphysics is then the memory of the difference of Being. 
And yet, in the just-above quote Heidegger also says that metaphysics wants to “regain beings for the concept”. The term concept is crucial in that onto-theology is not just the inquiry of beings with regard to a supreme cause and vice-versa, but is also just as essentially the study of the concept as the subject-matter of logic, hence, onto-theo-logy. Beings and God are here at the service of the concept that is their highest manifestation. As the study of the concept, metaphysics is yet another turn, and as such yet again memory, but this time the turn doesn’t have the form of the circle but ultimately that of going forward. The study of the concept is the reflexive nature of knowledge which has as its criteria subjectivity, and as such it finds in the Cartesian cogito only its most synthetic expression. But this doesn’t mean that this turn hadn’t been effected before Descartes and that it won’t continue to be effected at an infernal rhythm after Descartes. The cogito as the reflexive knowledge is the expression of certainty, that ultimately the matter is the subject. This turn is the order of representation which is characterized by interiority and progress. The thing is here first present to the mind as representation, and then, in the very first step towards the object, unlike the Platonic psyche which tries to approach the thing in circles, representation is already a repetition, a step forward. In the very first perception of the object, the order of representation is already memory; the cogito is essentially – and this not only in the Cartesian discourse – relationship to the past. 
This logical turn as the scientific project of the mathematization of nature has its origin in magic, as it is witnessed also by its completion, which is the will to power. Magic here is to be understood in its original sense as wonder at the sight of a certain disposition of things. That is why the Nietzschean will to power is yet another turn of the Hegelian turn: the criteria of truth is then no longer the thinking subject, but the willing one. The world is not simply an object of representation but of willing. The will to power is here the expression of the triumph of the scientific method over science. From a Nietzschean point of view – the will to power being essentially a point of view – the scientific method is the moving unity, in an alternating rhythm, of art and science. The metaphysical turn as the presentation of beings is here the production of beings which takes precedence over their presence. 
At the beginning of the conference What is metaphysics?, after the preface, Heidegger starts by recalling Hegel’s word that – from the point of view of the sane – “philosophy is the inverted world” (die verkehrte Welt). The word at this place of Heidegger’s text cannot then fail to remind us of Nietzsche’s word, with which in Beyond good and evil, he characterizes the “new kind of philosophers” – “we, the reversed ones” (Wir Umgekehrten) (Nietzsche 2000, 44).  Said in passing, the translation as “we opposite men” doesn’t correctly render that which is here in tune with Nietzsche’s project of the “reversal of Platonism”. And then later, in the Post-face, Heidegger writes:
The modern research, along with other ways of representing and producing, has penetrated into the ground-trait of that truth that distinguishes beings through the will to will. The will to will has its heralding manifestation the ‘will to power’. The ‘will’ as the ground-trait of the being-ness of beings is the equating of beings with the actual so that the actuality of the actual is raised to the power of the unconditional productivity of the thorough objectification.(Heidegger 1960, 44)​[11]​ 

Are these all the turns that the matter in question holds in itself? Let us recall here again that the matter in question as the destiny of Being is this reciprocal turn of Being into time and vice-versa. If the conference What is metaphysics? goes after the question of the temporal essence of ek-sistence, that of Time and Being goes more towards the very question of time. The question that I raised at the beginning of this paper, namely, what is memory?, can only be worked out from the perspective of our understanding of time. I tried to expound here that, following closely Heidegger’s thinking, we cannot think of metaphysics as mere forgetfulness, for metaphysics is, in more than one way, essential remembering. Metaphysics is also memory in yet another dimension, that of translation. Our reliance on logic, on language and its grammatical structures, is yet another way how, through translation, we relate to the past. And yet, metaphysics is just as essentially a forgetting. On the other hand, if Heidegger, with his constant reflection on the question of Being, invites our thinking to become more essentially memory, this memory is not one that exhaustively unearths, in order to bring to the daylight of the present, all that tradition holds from its origin. Holding forward as well as holding back are both at play in memory. In trying to expound in a different language Heidegger’s thinking, I have constantly struggled here with translation. Translation plays an important role in the misunderstandings that surround Heidegger’s thinking. It is not that Heidegger’s language is complex, on the contrary, it is very simple. But precisely because of his very simple German, it defies linguistic correspondence and transposition. 



















^1	 Notes All the translations in English of Heidegger are mine, unless otherwise indicated. I give in the endnotes the corresponding original text. The references of all my Engliish translations of Heidegger are to the original text.“Sein und Zeit, Zeit und Sein nennen das Verhältnis beider Sachen, den Sachverhalt, der beide Sache zueinander hält und ihr Verhältnis aushält. Diesem Sachverhalt nachzusinnen, ist dem Denken aufgegeben”
^2	  “‚Sein als das Ereignis’ – Früher dachte die Philosophie vom Seienden her Sein als ίδεά, als actualitas, als Wille und jetzt – könnte man denken – als Ereignis. So verstanden, meint Ereignis eine abgewandelte Auslegung des Seins, die, falls sie zurecht besteht, eine Fortführung der Metaphysik darstellt. Das ‚als’ bedeutet in diesem Falle: Ereignis als eine Art des Seins, untergeordnet dem Sein, das den festgehaltenen Leitbegriff bildet. Denken wir jedoch, wie es versucht wurde, Sein im Sinne von Anwesen und Anwesenlassen, die es im Geschick gibt, das seinerseits im lichtend-verbergenden Reichen der eigentlichen Zeit beruht, dann gehört das Sein in das Ereignen. ... Dann wäre das Sein eine Art des Ereignisses und nicht das Ereignis eine Art des Seins. Die Zuflucht in eine solche Umkehrung wäre zu billig. Sie denkt am Sachverhalt vorbei. Ereignis ist nicht der umgreifende Obergriff, unter den sich Sein und Zeit einordnen liessen. Logische Ordnungbeziehungen sagen hier nichts.”
^3	  “Sein ohne das Seiende denken heisst: Sein ohne Rücksicht auf die Metaphysik denken. Eine solche Rücksicht herrscht nun aber auch doch in der Absicht, die Metaphysik zu überwinden. Darum gilt es, vom Überwinden abzulassen und die Metaphysik sich selbst zu überlassen. Wenn ein Ueberwindung nötig bleibt, dann geht sie dasjenige Denken an, das sich eigens in das Ereignis einlässt, um Es aus ihm her auf es zu – zu sagen.”
^4	  Quoted following the translation of Macquarrie and Robinson., 1962.
^5	  “Was bedeutet ‘Existenz’ in S. u Z. ? Das Wort nennt eine Weise des Seins, und zwar das Sein desjenigen Seienden, das offen steht für die Offenheit des Seins, in der es steht, indem es sie aussteht. Dieses Ausstehen wird unter dem Namen ‘Sorge’ erfahren. Das ekstatische Wesen des Daseins ist von der Sorge her gedacht ... Das so erfaherene Ausstehen ist das Wesen der hier zu denkenden Ekstasis. Das ekstatische Wesen der Existenz wird deshalb auch dann noch unzureichend verstanden, wenn man es nur als ‘Hinausstehen’ vorstellt und das ‘Hinaus’ als das ‘Weg von’ dem Inneren einer Immanenz des Bewusstsein und des Geistes auffasst; denn so verstanden, wäre die Existenz immer noch von der ‘Subjektivität’ und der ‘Substanz’ her vorgestellt, während doch das ‘Aus’ als das Auseinander der Offenheit des Seins selbst zu denken bleibt. Die Stasis des Ekstatischen beruht, so seltsam es klingen mag, im Innestehen im ‘Aus’ und ‘Da’ der Unverborgenheit, als welche das Sein selbst west. Das, was im Namen ‘Existenz’ zu denken ist, das auf die Wahrheit des Seins zu und aus ihr her denkt, könnte das Wort ‘Inneständigkeit’ am schönsten nennen.”
^6	  “Wohin und woher und in welcher freien Dimension sollte sich denn alle Intentionalität des Bewusstseins bewegen, wenn der Mensch nicht schon in der Inständigkeit sein Wesen hätte?
^7	  “Der Versuch, Sein ohne das Seiende zu denken, wird notwendig, weil anders sonst, wie mir scheint, keine Möglichkeit mehr besteht, das Sein dessen, was heute rund um den Erdball ist, eigens in den Blick zu bringen”
^8	  “Nachdem die moderne Technik ihre Ausbreitung und Herrschaft über die ganze Erde hin eingerichtet hat, kreisen nicht erst die Sputniks und deren Ableger um unseren Planeten, sondern das Sein als Anwesen im Sinne des berechenbaren Bestandes spricht alsbald gleichförmig alle Erdbewohner an, ohne dass die Bewohner der aussereuropäischen Erdteile eigens davon wissen, oder gar von der Herkunft dieser Bestimmung des Seins wissen können und wissen mögen. (Am wenigstens mögen ein solches Wissen offenbar die geschäftigen Entwickler, die heute die sogennanten Unterentwickelten in den Hörbereich desjenigen Anspruchs des Seins drängen, der aus dem Eigensten der modernen Technik spricht).”
^9	  “Gesezt aber, der Überwindung der Metaphysik entspräche das Bemühen, erst einmal auf die Seinsvergessenheit achten zu lernen, um sie zu erfahren und diese Erfahrung in den Bezug des Seins zum Menschen aufzunehmen und darin zu verwahren, dann bliebe die Frage ‘Was ist Metaphysik ?’ in der Not der Seinsvergessenheit doch vielleicht das Notwendigste alles Notwendingen für das Denken.”
^10	  “Metaphysik ist das Hinausfragen über das Seiende, um es als ein solches und im Ganzen für das Begreifen zurückzuerhalten.”
^11	  “Die neuzeitliche Forschung ist mit anderen Weisen des Vorstellens und mit anderen Arten des Herstellens von Seiendem in den Grundzug derjenigen Wahrheit eingelassen, der gemäss alles Seiende durch den Willen zum Willen gezeichnet ist, als dessen Vorform der ‚Wille zur Macht’ das Erscheinen begonnen hat. ‚Wille’ als Grundzug der Seiendheit des Seienden verstanden, ist die Gleichsetzung des Seienden mit dem Wirklichen dergestalt, dass die Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen zur bedingungslosen Machbarkeit der durchgaengigen Vergegenständlichung ermächtigt wird.”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